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Abstract 
The paper compares the essential features of the Italian banking system with those of the other large 
euro-area countries. The analysis focuses on banks’ size, ownership and competitiveness, their role 
in financing firms, the composition of their balance sheets and their degree of internationalization, 
profitability and terms for customers. Within this overall framework the paper examines the 
banking system’s response to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and subsequent developments. The 
progress made in decades past is recalled and further necessary steps set out. 
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Introduction 
 
Banks have always been the main source of finance for the Italian economy, so grasping the 
main features, strengths and weaknesses of the banking system is essential to understanding the 
country’s economic prospects, especially given the growing integration of international financial 
markets. This paper discusses the main facts concerning Italy’s banking system, comparing it with 
those of the other large euro-area countries, Germany, France and Spain. After gauging the system’s 
size (Section 1) and role in the financing of firms (Section 2), the essay analyzes its structure and 
geographical distribution (Section 3) and ownership (Section 4). We next focus on the composition 
of banks’ balance sheets (Section 5), degree of internationalization (Section 6), profitability 
(Section 7) and the cost of loans (Section 8). This is followed by an account of the Italian credit 
system’s reaction to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and developments thereafter (Section 9). The 
conclusions sum up the indubitable progress made in years past and detail the ground that Italy still 
needs to make up. 
 
1. A small banking system within a small financial system 
 
 The Italian banking system is small. At the end of 2010 total balance-sheet assets came to 2.5 
times the country’s GDP, compared with 3.3 times in Germany and Spain and 4.1 times in France 
(Table 1). Most of the other main indicators of banking business, such as deposits or lending to 
households in relation to GDP point to similar conclusions. 
 Economic theory offers no consensus explanation of the determinants of the size of the banking 
and financial system. But even without a theoretical frame of reference we can argue that it is 
influenced by a country’s historical legacy, by the legal and regulatory system (La Porta et al., 
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1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001), by tax systems, by social capital (Guiso et al., 2004), and 
by the political and institutional system (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).
1
 
 With due caution, it can be maintained that the Italian banking system is small because the 
entire financial system is less highly developed than in other countries. And in fact the portion of 
total financial assets consisting of bank assets in Italy is comparable to that in the other countries of 
Europe (Table 1). In proportion to GDP, however, stock market capitalization is lower (28 per cent 
at the end of 2010 in Italy as against 42 per cent in Germany, 44 per cent in Spain and 67 per cent in 
France). And the relative size of the financial sector – banks, the central bank, non-bank 
intermediaries, insurance companies and private-sector pension funds – is also smaller, owing 
above all to the lesser development of insurance companies and pension funds. 
 On the liability side, the lower ratio of bank deposits to GDP could depend on the larger portion 
of household portfolios that consists of debt securities of government and private corporations, 
whose liquidity is comparable to that of time deposits, and on the competition of post office 
deposits, which is not as strong abroad as in Italy because post offices have often been privatized 
and converted into banks. 
 
2. The banks are central to the financing of firms 
 
 In this small financial system, the importance of banks in providing finance to firms stands out. 
Italy’s underdeveloped stock market and underdeveloped corporate bond market have always made 
industry dependent on bank credit. Fewer than 300 companies are listed on the stock exchange, 
compared with 760 in Germany and 630 in France. Italy remains a country of small firms, which 
average just 3 workers each, against 4 in Spain, 6 in France and 11 in Germany. Company owners 
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Gale (2000), and De Bonis and Pozzolo (2012). 
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make limited contributions of capital. Italy has one of the lowest ratios of own funds to total 
company liabilities, and debt financing is correspondingly important.
2
 
 The major role of banks for the Italian economy was apparent already at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The classical interpretation is that France, Germany and Italy were not ready to 
rely on the financial markets to fund economic growth because of competition from the United 
Kingdom, the dominant power of the day, which had built up a significant competitive advantage in 
the financial sector. In France, Germany and Italy the financing of industrial growth had to take 
paths different from the British, combining a major role for the banks with that of the state 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). Apart from this historical heritage, the underdevelopment of the financial 
markets in Italy has also been ascribed to other factors: the determination of mainly family-
controlled firms to keep outside shareholders away; the prevalence of the public pension system, 
which leaves little room for institutional investors and thus reduces the potential demand for shares; 
and the legal system, which has been blamed for failing to protect minority shareholders and small 
investors (for a recent review and summary, see Enriques et al., 2011).  
 Whatever the explanation for the relative backwardness of Italian financial markets, there is no 
doubt that it has helped to make bank funding central. Bank lending to firms is equal to 57 per cent 
of GDP, compared with 43 per cent in France and 36 per cent in Germany; only Spain, another 
bank-based financial system, has a higher ratio, 86 per cent. Bank credit to sole proprietorships is 
also higher in Italy than in the rest of the euro area. 
 Italian banks’ marked specialization in lending to small businesses has also influenced the 
overall evolution of the system (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). Very often relations between banks 
and firms are on a fiduciary basis that is a serious impediment to the expansion of credit institutions 
(Alessandrini et al., 2009). 
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3. The structure of the system: large groups and small banks, little market concentration 
 
 The Italian banking system at the turn of the 1990s has been described as a “petrified forest” 
whose essential features were unchanged since the 1930s. By international standards there were a 
large number of banks and a small number of branches; the system was dominated by local 
oligopolies. It was hard for any bank to penetrate where its competitors were traditionally 
established. Branch openings were regulated and rationed, and bank mergers were not encouraged 
or were prohibited outright, given the massive presence of state-owned banks (see Section 4). 
 Since 1990, the structure of the banking system has changed owing to two chief factors: the 
liberalization of branching and the increase in mergers and acquisitions. The number of branches 
jumped from 16,600 in 1990 to 33,600 in 2010: more new branches were established in these 
twenty years than in the previous sixty, when barriers to moving into local markets were in place. 
And between 1990 and 2006, mergers and acquisitions redistributed market shares amounting to a 
third of total banking assets. This wave of consolidations was the main factor in reducing the 
number of banks from 1,200 in 1990 to under 800 today. Even so, the average number of banks per 
province has risen. The liberalization of branch openings led to greater territorial overlap between 
banks, to the benefit of competition.
3
 
 Despite the mergers and acquisitions, Italy still has a comparatively high number of banks: less 
than half as many as in Germany but slightly greater than in France’s larger banking market and 
more than twice as many as in Spain (Figure 1). The large number of banks means relatively low 
asset concentration, higher only than Germany’s in the euro area. The Herfindahl index for Italian 
bank assets is less than 400, and the five largest intermediaries hold just over one third of all bank 
assets (Table 2). The greatest concentration among the main countries is in France, with a 
Herfindahl index of over 600 and five banks holding nearly half of all assets. The low degree of 
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concentration in Italy also reflects the fact that in the case of the larger banks acquisitions have 
outweighed mergers. Italian banking concentration would be greater if it were measured by 
consolidated statistics for banking groups. 
 Economic analysis is critical of the use of the national concentration index, since for retail 
banking the relevant market is provincial or at most regional. Local banking market concentration 
in Italy is low, while in Germany it is very high (European Commission, 2006). Examining the role 
of local banks in the European Structural Funds’ Objective 1 regions of Italy, Spain and Germany 
from 2000 to 2006, Nuzzo and Oliviero (2011) come to a similar conclusion. The presence of local 
banks in these areas is less substantial in Italy than in Germany or Spain, confirming the diminished 
importance of provincial or regional oligopolies.  
 Italian banks tend to be relatively small, whether in terms of assets or number of employees. On 
average, they are larger than German but smaller than French or Spanish banks. However, the large 
number of branches, with relatively small staffs, results in a territorial presence on a par with that of 
the other countries save Spain, where the dispersion of the population has favoured the creation of 
an extremely extensive branch network (Figure 2). Today the number of inhabitants per branch is 
1,794 in Italy, much higher than in Spain (1,034), comparable with France (1,676), and lower than 
in Germany (2,077). 
 The smaller size of the banking system translates into a relatively smaller number of bank 
employees: 1.4 per cent of the total work force, compared with 1.8 per cent in France and 1.7 per 
cent in Germany (Table 2). Even so, the value of assets under management per employee is the 
lowest of all the main euro-area countries. 
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4. Ownership is private 
 
 From a long-run perspective, the transition to private ownership in the 1990s was probably the 
single most important change to the Italian credit system since the Second World War. As a result 
of government rescue operations during the Great Depression, by the end of the 1930s state-owned 
banks held 70 per cent of total credit system assets, a market share that remained broadly 
unchanged for six decades. In the 1990s, after the transformation of the public banks into limited 
companies, privatization got off to a fast start. Italy has ended public ownership of banks, de facto, 
unlike Germany and Spain, where government holdings of bank capital remain a distinctive trait of 
the national economy, or such other countries as the United Kingdom and Ireland, where the 
financial instability triggered by the crisis of 2007 led to the practical nationalization of a good part 
of the credit system.
4
 
 Italian banks are either limited companies, cooperative banks (banche popolari), or mutual 
banks (banche di credito cooperativo). At the end of 2010 the market shares of these three 
categories were respectively 80 per cent, 9 per cent, and 7 per cent of customer deposits, with 
branches of foreign banks holding the remaining 5 per cent. 
 The characteristics of the banking system include concentrated ownership, cross shareholdings 
and interlocking directorates. The concentration of ownership, which is a common trait of Italian 
listed companies in general, is less pronounced among banks than among companies in other 
industries. Cross shareholdings among the large banks are less extensive than in the other countries 
of continental Europe (Gobbi, 2008). In theory, interlocking directorates, another feature shared by 
industrial firms, could distort competition, especially when the same men sit on the boards of banks 
and borrower firms (Autorità garante della concorrenza and del mercato, 2010). On the other hand, 
the presence of bankers on corporate boards may also have served to certify their creditworthiness 
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vis-à-vis lenders not present on those boards, thus attenuating informational asymmetry and helping 
to contain interest rates (Stacchini and Cau, 2010). 
 The financial crisis confirmed that good corporate governance is essential to banks’ stability 
(Mehran et al., 2011). In Italy, the discussion now centres on three main themes. One, in the 
spotlight for decades now, is the reform of the banche popolari. As in other countries, they are 
characterized by limits on the size of individual shareholdings, equal voting rights (one member, 
one vote), and clauses requiring approval of new members. These are features that Italy’s banche 
popolari share with the German Volksbanken and the French banques populaires.
5
  
 These governance arrangements would still seem to be appropriate to the small banche popolari, 
whose customers largely coincide with their membership. But the largest banche popolari, which 
now do business outside their original home areas and are listed on the stock exchange, more 
closely resemble public limited companies in which directors are relatively sheltered from takeover 
risk. Although historically the cooperatives have equaled or topped the profit performance of the 
credit system as a whole,
6
 several pieces of legislation have been drafted to improve their 
governance, especially that of the listed banche popolari. The proposals are to raise the ceiling on 
share ownership, increase the role of institutional investors, simplify the procedure for transforming 
the cooperatives into limited companies, facilitating the transferability of shares, and introducing 
measures to increase shareholders’ participation at membership meetings (Tarantola, 2011). 
 The second theme is the role of banking foundations. Starting in the 1990s the old public banks 
transferred their assets and liabilities to new limited share company banks, of which they took 
control in the form of foundations. The foundations were then recognized as private law persons. 
Frequently they gave up their controlling stakes. Today they retain stakes larger than 5 per cent in 
over 50 banks and hold more than 20 per cent in two of Italy’s major banks (IMF, 2011). The 
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foundations have ensured stable ownership arrangements in Italian banks and carried out substantial 
recapitalizations during the crisis. 
 The third theme – regardless of the intermediaries’ governance and control structure – is the 
recent intervention of the Bank of Italy as supervisory authority on various aspects of corporate 
governance, to underscore in particular: i) that the functions of strategic oversight, management and 
control must be distinct so as to avoid overlapping and conflicts of powers; ii) that the body 
responsible for strategic oversight must include independent directors as a safeguard in the matters 
most subject to conflicts of interest; and iii) that executive compensation must be consistent not 
only with the need to attract talent but also with the bank’s long-run objectives. Thanks to these 
interventions, among other things, the presence of local politicians on the boards of the foundations 
does not appear to have undercut the banks’ independent management.7  
 
5. Balance-sheet composition: lots of retail funding, little interbank funding, low leverage 
 
 The Italian economy’s low degree of financialization and the specialization in finance to firms 
have had pronounced effects on banks’ balance sheets. On the asset side, at the end of 20108 the 
relatively large share accounted for by loans to firms corresponded to a lower proportion of home 
mortgages and consumer lending to households, especially in relation to GDP. There are various 
explanations of why Italy has lagged behind in lending to households:  their credit demand may 
have been reduced, until very recently, by a high propensity to save, together with the mechanism 
of intergenerational transfers both of money and of home ownership; there has been a cultural 
diffidence towards personal debt, and the banks have been prudent in expanding this line of 
business. It is no coincidence that the branches of foreign banks have gained market shares in 
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lending to households, a field in which these new entrants are less vulnerable to information 
asymmetry than in lending to businesses (Infante and Rossi, 2009). Households’ lower leverage is 
one of the factors that buffered the impact of the 2007 crisis on Italian banks. 
 Still on the asset side, securities make up a smaller portion of Italian banks’ assets than the 
average in the euro area (17 as against 19 per cent; Table 3a). But the share of government 
securities is larger, virtually all in the form of Italian Treasury paper; the exposure to other 
sovereign debtors is negligible. In July 2011 the ratio of government securities holdings to banks’ 
capital plus reserves was 67 per cent in Italy, roughly equal to the euro-area average and sharply 
lower than the 81 per cent registered in Germany. By contrast, interbank exposures are very low, 
especially by comparison with Germany and France, owing notably to the absence of the large 
bilateral interbank exposures that are found in the rest of Europe.
9
 
 Symmetrically, the liability side reveals the importance of retail business in Italy. At the end of 
2010 customer deposits accounted for 37 per cent of total liabilities in Italy, compared with 32 per 
cent in the euro area as a whole (Table 3b). The portion of total deposits consisting of current 
accounts is the highest in the area, while time deposits make up a relatively small share. The portion 
consisting of bonds has increased greatly in recent years (to 21 per cent of total liabilities in Italy 
against 15 per cent in the euro area). Since the turn of the century the tax treatment of interest 
income has discouraged time deposits and offered an incentive for bond issues.
10
 The banks 
increased their bond issuance in part in order to expand their medium- and long-term lending, which 
nevertheless remains less important than in other countries. Their market power certainly facilitated 
the placement of bonds, which the public perceives as safe (no Italian bank in memory has ever 
defaulted on its securities issues). The portion of liabilities accounted for by interbank loans is 
lower than in the rest of the euro area. Italian banks’ lesser reliance on wholesale funding helped 
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attenuate the repercussions of the collapse of confidence in the international money market between 
2007 and 2009. 
 Italian banks’ capital and reserves in relation to unweighted risk assets – a rough equivalent to 
the financial leverage indicator called for in the Basel 3 agreements – is high. This gearing ratio is 9 
per cent in Italy, compared with 5 per cent in Germany and 6 per cent in the euro area as a whole. 
This is the result of the relative smallness, as we have seen, of some asset items, in particular 
trading book securities and interbank loans. 
 As to capital ratios, Italian banks passed the European Banking Authority’s stress test in July 
2011 with flying colours.
11
 Considering risk-weighted assets, the solvency ratio of the large Italian 
banks was lower than the European average, owing to two factors: the absence of the public capital 
injections by which many European banks have benefited since 2007 and greater supervisory 
strictness in the definition of eligible capital.
12
 Italian banks have begun the capital strengthening 
needed to meet the new capital requirements of Basel 3 by 2019 and have raised 50 per cent of the 
necessary capital. 
 
6. Internationalization: cross-border business and opening to foreign competition 
 
 Italian banks are less internationalized than those of the other leading industrial countries, both 
in terms of direct business with non-residents and in terms of the presence of bank branches and 
subsidiaries abroad. By contrast, the presence of foreign banks in Italy is substantial. 
 Assets vis-à-vis non-residents accounted for 10 per cent of the total in 2009 (Table 4), compared 
with 29 per cent in Germany and France and 12 per cent in Spain. This scanty international 
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 On the successive requests of new capital due to the increased riskiness of bank assets following the sovereign debt 
crisis, see the discussion in Section 9.2.. 
12
 The prudential statistics on bank capital are not harmonized. “As revealed by the crisis, the existing definition of 
prudential own funds (capital) suffers from several fundamental flaws: (i) lack of a precise boundary between different 
capital components, (ii) inconsistent definition and application of regulatory adjustments.” ECB (2010). See also the 
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diversification characterizes all the main asset components: loans to non-financial corporations, 
interbank lending, and securities. On the liability side, non-residents’ deposits with Italian banks are 
in line with German and Spanish banks, lower than those with French banks. 
 The greater incidence of liabilities than of assets vis-à-vis non-residents reflects the banks’ role 
in financing the net debtor position in international investment that has marked Italy for a good 
many years now. Whereas in the later 1990s it was chiefly net portfolio investment by non-residents 
that financed the Italian economy, since then the role of the banks’ net debtor position has grown 
steadily more important (Table 5). The resources raised abroad have funded a growth in lending to 
residents that has outstripped the banks’ domestic fund-raising. And while there is little reliance on 
interbank funding domestically, in Italy – as in Spain – the interbank market accounts for the bulk 
of external liabilities, especially within the euro area. 
 Italian banks’ presence abroad with branches or subsidiaries is also limited. Considering banks 
with total assets of €20 million or more, Piscitello and Pozzolo (2006) find that they had controlling 
stakes in 43 foreign banks and had 66 branches abroad. These figures are comparable with those for 
Spain (47 subsidiaries and 71 branches) but far below those for Germany (109 and 246) or France 
(140 and 226). This lesser internationalization reflects a general feature of the Italian economy, 
namely limited outward investment by Italian firms and the country’s limited capacity to attract 
foreign direct investment. As with industrial firms, this is explained in part by the small average 
size of Italian banks, which has been shown to impede internationalization (see Focarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2001; Caiazza et al., 2011). In fact, the only two Italian banks comparable in assets and 
capitalization to leading European intermediaries both display a significant propensity for 
international business; so much so that they have now been placed under observation by the Basel 
Committee to assess their systemic importance. 
 By contrast, the presence and direct operations in Italy of foreign banks are greater than in the 
other main euro-area countries, with some differences in organizational form. The proportion of 
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foreign bank branches is higher than in Germany, lower than in Spain and France. The share of 
foreign-controlled banks established under domestic law is equal to that in Germany and smaller 
than in Spain and France (Table 5). Foreign banks doing business in Italy through branches or 
subsidiaries account for over 13 per cent of total Italian banking system assets, the largest portion in 
any of the countries considered here. So the Italian banking system must be considered as definitely 
open to foreign competition. 
 
7. Banks’ profitability is high and relatively stable 
 
 Traditional banking has always constituted a large part of Italian banks’ business, and net 
interest income plays an accordingly large role in the formation of profit (Figure 3). As in the other 
countries of Europe, since the end of the 1980s the fall in inflation has meant a decline in interest 
earnings. In Italy, net interest income remains in line with that of Spain, higher than in Germany 
and France. For Italian banks, income from services is less important than net interest income; it did 
increase between 1995 and 2000, during the expansion of the financial markets, thanks for instance 
to fees for the placing of investment fund units (Figure 4). After 2000 revenue from services was 
curbed by the end of the dot-com bubble but remained high by historical standards. Since 2007, 
with the financial crisis, it has fallen. Today it is at levels comparable to those found in the other 
main countries except Germany, where it is lower. 
 The ratio of Italian banks’ operating costs to total assets has come down in the last twenty years 
but is still higher than in the other countries (Figure 5). The banks are continuing to curb costs. 
Some have rationalized their branch networks, and in 2009 and 2010, for the first time since branch 
liberalization in 1990, the number of branches fell. 
 Italian banks’ gross operating profits have traditionally been high. In the last ten years, with the 
contraction in net interest income, they have diminished but are still higher than in Germany or 
13 
 
France. Return on equity contracted sharply in the mid-1990s with the crisis at some southern 
Italian banks (Figure 6), but recovered in 1996 and held at around 10 per cent from 2000 to 2006. 
The financial crisis drove banks’ ROE down everywhere. It remained positive in Italy and Spain but 
was negative in the UK and Germany in 2008 and 2009 and in France in 2008. 
 From 1988 through 2009 the average ROE of Italian banks was higher than that of German 
banks and lower than that of French, Spanish and British (for the latter, however, the high returns 
were accompanied by high risk, which exploded with the crisis). Additional confirmation of the 
prudent balance-sheet management of Italian banks come from the fact that the volatility of ROE, 
whether measured by variation coefficients or standard deviations, has been lower in Italy than 
elsewhere, except in Spain. 
 
8. Lending rates in line with euro-area average 
 
 Until the Lehman Brothers default in September 2008, lending rates in the euro area tended to 
converge. The convergence was greater for home mortgages (Figure 7) and loans to firms (Figure 
8), not as marked for consumer credit (Figure 9). But since the end of 2008 the international 
dispersion of interest rates, measured either by coefficients of variation or by standard deviation, 
has increased for all types of lending. The financial crisis, the increase in risk and the differing 
responses of national banking systems inverted the tendency to interest rate convergence. It is worth 
examining the price of credit charged by Italian banks in comparison with those in other countries 
in detail. 
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8.1 Loans to firms 
 
Interest rates on loans to firms in Italy are broadly in line with the euro-area average, both for loans 
larger than €1 million, which generally go to larger firms (2.5 per cent in Italy in December 2010, 
2.6 per cent in the euro area; Figure 10) and for smaller loans (3.2 per cent in Italy, 3.6 per cent in 
the area; Figure 11). The lower interest rate charged to large firms reflects a number of factors both 
in Italy and throughout the area: the banks specializing in large loans enjoy economies of scale in 
assessing creditworthiness, and in lending to these large corporations, which ordinarily have 
substantial tangible assets, there is less informational asymmetry, and banks have less market power 
and take less risk. 
 One specific feature in Italy is the large role of credit made available through current account 
overdrafts. In December 2010 Italy accounted for 32 per cent of all euro-area overdraft credit to 
firms and households, compared with 15 per cent of bank loans. Overdrafts allow the bank to 
change the interest rate at any time; it is likely that they are utilized by banks as a tool for 
monitoring small firms’ cash flow. For borrowers, this instrument allows the utilization, at their 
discretion, of any desired portion of the overdraft granted, paying interest only on the amount 
actually drawn. For firms the cost of current account overdraft credit in Italy is in line with the rest 
of Europe. For households, the ample supply of overdraft facilities results in lower interest rates. 
 
8.2 Home mortgage loans 
 
Since 2003 home mortgage rates in Italy have mostly been lower than the euro-area average 
(Figure 12).
13
 The only exception came during the three years from 2006 through 2008. During that 
phase, when the ECB was raising its policy rates, Italian households guarded against the risk of 
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further rises (which did materialize) by turning to fixed-rate mortgages, which were more costly in 
Italy. A typically Italian characteristic, due perhaps to the banks’ greater difficulty in raising 
medium- and long-term funds, is the higher rates on fixed than variable rates, even at times of 
monetary restriction. Since the end of 2008, at a time of expansionary monetary policy following 
the Lehman Brothers collapse and the explosion of the financial crisis, Italian mortgage rates have 
been below the area-wide average. One factor is the great popularity of lower-cost variable-rate 
mortgages.
14
 
 
8.3 Consumer credit 
 
The cost that Italian households sustain to finance consumption is higher than in Germany, France, 
Spain or the euro area generally (Figure 13). The interest rates on consumer credit are relatively 
insensitive to monetary policy impulses owing to the structure of its supply and the nature of the 
demand for this financing service. The supply of consumer credit is marked by the smallness of the 
market, which impedes returns to scale, and concentration at just a few intermediaries, frequently 
foreign-controlled, which tends to foster strategies based on market power to set prices higher than 
marginal costs.
15
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9. Since 2007: A good response to the crisis and the recent tensions 
 
9.1 The financial crisis of 2007-09 
 
The financial crisis that was triggered in the summer of 2007 by the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market in the United States and then spread worldwide had a limited impact on the Italian 
banking system. The virtues of a more traditional business model based on careful assessment of 
borrowers’ creditworthiness, stable funding and strict supervision ensured that no Italian bank failed 
and that government injections of capital to banks were extremely modest. 
The lower degree of development of the Italian banking system by comparison with the rest of 
the euro area and even more with the British and American systems is connected with Italian banks’ 
traditionally prudent lending policies and the relative unimportance of investment banking, which in 
hindsight proved to be much riskier than it might have seemed at first. The reasons for this greater 
prudence are not buried deep in the past. The drastic deterioration of borrowers’ solvency in the 
mid-1990s, following the crisis that drove Italy out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 
1992 and brought a sharp recession the next year, had caused the bad loan ratio to leap to 12 per 
cent in 1996. Many banks that had been lax in borrower selection, in part for political reasons 
(Sapienza, 2004),  were forcibly merged into sounder banks, mostly located in the Centre and North 
of Italy. The cleansing effect of this searing crisis for the banking system helped foster more careful 
screening by banks, with a greater capacity to monitor debtors and probably greater risk aversion 
(Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006). Today, despite the difficult cyclical phase, the bad debt ratio is no more 
than 5 per cent. 
Prudence has been greatest in lending to households. For mortgage lending, the loan-to-value 
ratio is low by international standards. At the same time, Italian banks’ lesser propensity for 
financial innovation discouraged such practices as mortgage equity withdrawals, which in some 
17 
 
countries were the main driver of mortgage lending. Before 2007 the expansion of lending had 
sustained the demand for houses in the UK, Ireland, Spain and the United States, sparking a price 
boom. In Italy, the smaller size of the mortgage market attenuated the dependence of demand on 
credit and limited the impact on real estate prices. When the bubble burst the house price decline 
was not as sharp in Italy as elsewhere, and the effect on banks’ balance sheets was correspondingly 
less severe. 
 The relatively modest amount of investment banking in Italy – linked with customers’ lack of 
financial sophistication and the historic competitive disadvantage of Italian vis-à-vis British, 
American and the major German and French banks – was another factor making Italian banks less 
vulnerable to the crisis, thanks to their lesser exposure to opaque and risky financial assets. 
Moreover, some cases of bond defaults in previous years (Cirio, Parmalat, Argentine government 
paper) had made banks more cautious in marketing securities to customers, which attenuated the 
repercussions of the collapse in the financial markets on the portfolios of households and borrower 
firms. Finally, supervisory controls on securitizations prevented them from becoming a source of 
instability (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Albertazzi et al., 2011). Special purpose vehicles had no 
particular financial problems in Italy, and the conversion of asset-backed securities into potentially 
risky instruments like CDOs and CDOs-squared was negligible. This helped keep the overall 
leverage of the financial system relatively low. And if during the years of financial euphoria this 
obviously resulted in lower profitability, when the crisis came it limited the losses. Finally, Italian 
banks’ low degree of internationalization ensured less exposure to the worst-hit financial markets. 
Prudent asset management and less aggressive use of leverage permitted greater prudence in 
funding as well. As we have seen, the share of banks’ fund-raising that comes from retail customers 
is greater than in the other countries, while interbank liabilities – on which there was a run that 
brought the collapse of a good number of banks (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Gorton and 
Metrick, 2011) – are more limited. During the crisis the greater stability of banks’ sources of 
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funding eased the impact in Italy of the tensions in the international money markets, thanks in part 
to the supervisory authorities, who tightened controls on banks’ liquidity as far back as 2007. 
 The milder impact of the crisis produced a more moderate deceleration of credit than in other 
countries. The large banks, with their greater dependence on the international interbank and bond 
markets, slowed their lending more sharply. In part the resulting slack was taken up by smaller 
banks, which exploited their direct relationships with customers at a time of uncertainty over 
borrowers’ solvency.16 Credit growth – to both firms and households – is stronger now in Italy than 
in the euro-area countries as a group (Figures 14 and 15). 
 The repercussions of the financial crisis of 2007-09 on the productive economy could not fail to 
affect the Italian financial system, but Italian banks weathered the crisis better than those in most 
other countries. New problems were already looming, however. 
 
9.2 The sovereign debt crisis 
 
 The massive government interventions in many countries to salvage the financial system in the 
2007-09 crisis put a strain on Italian banks. The growing demand for public funds generated by 
budget deficits reduced the capacity of many nations to place their paper at sustainable interest 
rates. At first the debt crisis struck Greece, Ireland and Portugal, euro-area countries with large 
budget deficits. During that period, Italian banks’ relative lack of internationalization appeared to be 
a strength: by comparison with German and French banks, they had much smaller investments in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Table 6).
17
 
 During the summer of 2011 the sovereign debt crisis spread to Italy and threatened even France. 
Worried that Italian government securities make up some 40 per cent of Italian banks’ bond 
                                                 
16
 Panetta and Signoretti (2010). 
17
 The data are from banks’ consolidated accounts. For example, the exposure of Italian banks to Germany, by this 
gauge, includes the assets of Italian banks’ German subsidiaries. In the same way, the exposure of French banks to Italy 
includes the assets of French banks’ Italian subsidiaries. 
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portfolio, the stock markets reacted negatively, with judgments out of line with the long-run 
performance of Italian banks. Home bias in portfolio composition is a feature of many other 
banking systems in countries with large public debts, such as Japan and Belgium. For Italian banks, 
holding the government securities of a euro-area country that are eligible as collateral for central 
bank refinancing has always been a factor of soundness. But the changed external framework has 
transformed what seemed to be a strength into a source of vulnerability, even though the pressures 
on the public debt are due to external causes and not to massive spending on bank bailouts as in, 
say, Ireland.
18
  
 The link between banks’ balance sheets and the state of the public finances is much looser today 
than in the past. In the 1990s Italian government securities made up some 80 per cent of the 
securities held by Italian banks, compared with 40 per cent today. Italian banks held 50 per cent of 
all outstanding Italian government paper in the 1970s and 20 per cent in the 1990s, when the ratio 
of the debt to GDP had risen to the level it is still at, but today the banks hold only 14 per cent. 
Greater diversification of the bond portfolio (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2011) 
would reduce the risk of a diminution of asset liquidity and a rise in funding costs, associated with 
excessive exposure to securities that could come under pressure. 
 Any national banking system inevitably depends on the general performance of the country’s 
economy. The consequences of the sovereign debt crisis are hard to foresee but they absolutely 
cannot be underestimated. A solution is essential not only to prevent the collapse of the financial 
system in some member countries but to ensure the very survival of the euro area. When the 
problem is resolved, Italian banks’ traditional caution may well prove, once again, to have been a 
bulwark for the stability of our financial system. 
 
                                                 
18
 As a result, on December 8th 2011 EBA published a formal recommendation on banks’ recapitalisation needs 
involving among others also four Italian banks. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
 For the banks, Italy’s involvement in the sovereign debt crisis is an exogenous event. When the 
strains ease, the banking system will in any case be facing a series of problems that are difficult but 
within its power to solve. The banks will have to cut operating costs in proportion to gross income, 
as this ratio is high by international standards. At a time of considerable financial market 
uncertainty they will have to increase their net revenue from services. They must improve relations 
with customers, increasing contract transparency. And they must make additional improvements in  
their corporate governance. 
 The traditional business model of Italian banks differs sharply from the prevalent British and 
American models but also from that of other European countries. This model sheltered Italian banks 
from the explosive crisis of 2007-09, thanks to a series of factors: the large portion of funding 
consisting in deposits and bonds held by households, low leverage, an appreciably high level of 
profits by international standards, the central role of banks in the asset management industry either 
directly or through subsidiaries, the maintenance of private ownership, and lending rates that are at 
or below the prevalent euro-area rates for most products. 
 Twenty years ago Italian banks were largely state-owned, sometimes mismanaged. The largest 
southern banks were on the verge of a grave crisis. Their insolvency was overcome by government 
capital injections and the intervention of other banks. Privatizations and consolidation helped make 
the system more robust. Looking back on the progress made, there can be no doubt of Italian banks’ 
ability to react successfully to the strains now affecting the euro area. 
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TABLE 1. Size of bank balance sheets in the large euro-area countries 
(end-2010 stocks as percentage of GDP for the year)
Euro area Germany Spain France Italy
Total assets 3.50 3.32 3.27 4.02 2.45
Loans to households 0.56 0.57 0.83 0.52 0.38
of wihich: for house pur chase 0.40 0.39 0.63 0.40 0.23
consumer cr edit 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04
other 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.11
Loans to fir ms 0.51 0.36 0.86 0.43 0.57
Deposits 2.19 2.07 2.39 2.29 1.47
memo: Total bank assets/financial 
assets of entir e economy 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.29
Sources: Harmonized statistics of Eur opean System of Central Banks; Eur ostat. Loans ar e to counterpar ties
resident in eur o area.
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TABLE 2. Structure of the banking system in the large euro-area 
countries, end-2009
Germany Spain France Italy
Her findahl index. assets 206 507 605 353
Market shar e of top 5 banks. % 25.0 43.3 47.2 34.0
Average size ( €mn) 3.811.1 9.753.6 10.049.8 4.609.2
Branches per 100.000 r esidents 48.1 96.7 59.7 56.5
Branches per bank 20.2 126.2 54.0 42.5
Employees per branch 17.3 6.0 12.4 9.9
Share of total work for ce. % 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.4
Source: ECB – EU Banking Str uctures (2010).
Riccardo De Bonis, Alberto Pozzolo and Massimiliano Stacchini
28
TABLE 3a. Composition of banks’ balance sheets in the large 
euro-area countries: Assets 
(ratio of main items to total assets, end-2010)
Euro area Germany Spain France Italy
Loans 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.60 0.66
Loans
to households 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.16
of which:
for house pur chase* 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.09
consumer cr edit* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
other* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05
Loans to fir ms 0.15 0.11 0.26 0.11 0.23
Loans to monetar y financial institutions 0.23 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.13
Non-equity securities 0.23 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.13
of which:
issued by non-r esidents
issued by gover nments** 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07
issued by banks** 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.06
Shares and other equity 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06
Other assets 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.10
Source: ESCB har monized statistics. 
**Euro-area resident counterpar ties.
**Euro-area residents. Rounding may cause discr epancies in totals.
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TABLE 3b. Composition of monetary financial institutions’ balance sheets
in the large euro-area countries: Liabilities 
(ratio of main items to total liabilities, end-2010)
Euro area Germany Spain France Italy
Deposits 0.64 0.62 0.72 0.56 0.60
of which: 
of banks 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.32 0.21
of residents* 0.32 36 0.50 0.21 0.37
current accounts** 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.20
with agreed maturity** 0.14 0.14 0.33 0.08 0.06
redeemable at notice** 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.07 07
Debt securities issued 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.21
Capital and r eser ves 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.09
Other liabilities*** 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.10
Source: ESCB har monized statistics.
*Other than MFIs.
**Other eur o-area residents and other general gover nment entities.
***Includes units of money-market funds. Rounding may cause discr epancies in totals
TABLE 4. Internationalization of the banking system in the large 
euro-area countries, end-2009 (percentages)
Germany Spain France Italy
Assets 28.5 12.1 28.7 10.0
of which: in EU 21.1 8.9 20.4 8.7
Prestiti 24.9 8.2 23.8 7.4
Loans 17.6 21.6 28.6 20.4
of which: in EU 11.8 18.8 17.0 17.3
Interbank deposits 34.9 40.4 39.7 49.1
of which: in EU 26.0 35.4 22.3 44.4
Source: ECB – EU Banking Str uctures (2009).
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TABLE 5. Foreign banks’ market shares and net external investment
position of the banking system in the large euro-area countries,
end-2009 (percentages)
Germany Spain France Italy
Foreign banks’ market share
Branches*
Number 5.2 24.6 12.8 10.0
Assets 2.5 6.5 2.0 6.4
of which: of EU banks 2.1 6.4 18 62
Subsidiaries
Number 2.5 12.2 17.0 2.7
Assets 8.3 3.6 8.7 7.0
of which: of  EU banks 7.6 3.3 8.0 6.6
Banks’ net external position
as % of GDP 18.7 -48.9 -11.1 -21.2
as % of total assets 6.1 -15.0 -3.0 -8.7
Percentage of all bank branches in the countr y.
Source: BCE - EU banking str uctures (2009).
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FIGURE 1. Number of banks in the large euro-area countries
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FIGURE 2. Number of bank branches in the large euro-area countries
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FIGURE 3. Banks’ net interest income
(as a per cent of total assets)
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FIGURE 4. Banks’ net income from services 
(as a per cent of total assets)
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FIGURE 5. Banks’ operating costs 
(as a per cent of total assets)
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FIGURE 6. Net profits
(as a per cent of total capital and reserves)
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FIGURE 7. Dispersion of interest rates in the euro area: 
home mortgage loans
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FIGURE 8. Dispersion of interest rates in the euro area: 
loans to firms
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FIGURE 9. Dispersion of interest rates in the euro area: 
consumer credit 
5,00
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Source: Based on ESCB har monized statistics.
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FIGURE 10. Interest rates on large loans to firms*
(per cent) 
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*Rates on loans lar ger than €1 million during the month.
Source: ESCB har monized statistics.
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FIGURE 11. Interest rates on small loans to firms*
(per cent)
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* Rates on loans smaller than €1 million during the month.
Source: Statistiche ar monizzate del Sistema eur opeo di banche centrali.
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FIGURE 12. Interest rates on home mortgage loans*
(per cent)
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Rates on loans during the month, including fees.
Source: ESCB har monized statistics.
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FIGURE 13. Interest rates on consumer credit*
(per cent)
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Rates on loans during the month, including fees.
Source: ESCB har monized statistics.
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FIGURE 14. Bank credit to euro-area resident firms
(twelve-month percentage change)
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Source: ESCB har monized statistics.
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FIGURE 15. Bank credit to euro-area resident households
(twelve-month percentage change)
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Source: ESCB har monized statistics.
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